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A b s t r a c t . This article presents some aspects o f political relations be­
tween the Polish government and the Norwegian government in years 
1940-45 when both governments were in exile in London. The author 
emphasizes that Polish-Norwegian relations in the period o f war were 
quite tough, full o f tensions, misunderstandings and journalistic inci­
dents. While remaining in London, both governments rejected to recog­
nize one another as the significant partners. They encountered differ­
ent political problems, so the close cooperation between them was 
doomed from the start. In the conclusions the author underlines that 
relations with the Soviet Union appeared to be fundamental for Nor­
wegian foreign policy. The Norwegian government was unwilling to co­
operate with Poland, as it could have threatened the good relations 
Norway had with the Soviet Union. Besides Norway felt closer to Great 
Britain and the United States, whereas Polish plans referred to the 
cooperation o f  small countries. That is why their diplomatic relations 
had rather formal than real character.
When the Second World War broke out the Norwegian 
government did not share the German viewpoint about the alleged disappear­
ance of the Polish state. Administered by Władysław Neuman, the Polish dip­
lomatic establishment in Oslo still carried on its work. On the other hand, for 
as long as it was possible the government of Norway would not undertake any­
thing that might have prematurely assessed the constitutional position of Po­
land..1 Consequently, from the autumn of 1939 the diplomatic relations be­
1 Riks Arkivet (hereafter: RA), Legasjon i Warszawa, 3 C19534, boks 69, Pol D, D itleff to 
Lagerberg 3 November 1939.
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tween the two countries worked on a one -  sided basis. The Norwegian gov­
ernment agreed to the functioning of the Polish diplomatic institution but no 
diplomat on its part was sent to the Polish government seated first in Paris and 
then in Angers. After the collapse of France the Polish government was evacu­
ated to Great Britain.
In June 1940 the Norwegian government joined many other governments 
in exile in London. The Polish deputy accredited to the Norwegian govern­
ment was one of the few diplomats to accompany the king Haakon VII and the 
government in their escape from Oslo, first to Troms0 and then to London. In 
the summer of 1940 Władysław Neuman paid a visit to the Norwegian minis­
try of foreign affairs. He asked then whether the government of Norway inten­
ded to appoint a diplomatic representative to the Polish government. Norwe­
gian minister of foreign affairs promised to do so as soon as an appropriate 
candidate was found.2 Finally on 22 November 1940 Halvdan Koht appointed 
Hans Christian Berg charge d ’affaires to the Polish government in London,3 
thus restoring a full range of diplomatic relations between Poland and Norway.
Officially the diplomatic relations were reinstated in January 1941. On 14 
January a reception was organised for the Norwegian government in the Polish 
House (in a Polish cultural institution) in London. President Władysław Racz- 
kiewicz and Prime Minister Gen. Władysław Sikorski hosted the Norwegian 
king, Haakon VII. Members of Polish, Norwegian, and British governments 
were also present.4
In 1941 the cooperation between the two countries went well. As Trygve 
Lie, the Norwegian foreign minister from November 1940, wrote in his diary 
“Med England i ildlinjen”, it was thanks to minister Neuman that Norway had 
better contact with the Polish government. Although the relations among the 
Poles in London were far from being stable, the Norwegians were always well 
familiarised with current opinions of the Polish government.
When the Soviet Union and the United States, two economic and military 
powers, declared war on Germany, it was clear for the Polish authorities that 
their rather strong position among other British allies would then be weakened. 
That is why it became so important that the position of the Polish government 
in London should be strengthened, by performing the role of a leader of all al­
lied governments. In 1941-1943 the Norwegian government had to take a stand 
on several propositions made by the Polish government, which aimed at find­
ing some forms of cooperation between “the smaller allies”. One of them was 
a concept of creating a federation or associations of European countries.
2 RA, Utenriksdepartementets arkiv 1940-1949 (hereafter: UDs arkiv 1940-1949), Fru 
Gleditsch arkiv for UD i London, 4 .01/9 Polen-Norge, Boks 9225, Address to cabinet meeting,
15 November 1940.
3 Ibidem, Letter from H. Koht to H. Ch. Berg, 22 November 1940.
4 Ibidem, Minutes o f  Polish-Norwegian reception, 14 January 1941.
5 T. Lie, M ed England i ildlijnen, Oslo 1956, p. 319.
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Gen. Sikorski had a wide programme of creating closely cooperating re­
gional agreements in Europe. He was counting on forming a central-European, 
Balkan, and Scandinavian federation.6 Norwegian foreign policy in the WWII 
period, called the Atlantic policy, completely broke with the interwar neutrality 
and aimed mainly at close relations with Great Britain and the United States. 
The government of Norway was only to a small degree concerned with the de­
bate over different forms of federal organisation of Europe. To Norway, a coun­
try on the periphery of Europe and with strong connections with Great Britain 
and the United States, the thought of closer political or military relations with 
the continent must have been a distant one. The Norwegians also knew that the 
Poles did not intend to provide them with an important function in such a 
system as the leadership was bound to fall to Sweden. Norway’s main goal 
was to avoid any associations that might have instigated tension or conflicts 
between the allies. Moreover, it was not insignificant that the Soviet Union 
was against any attempts at creating an independent federation of countries in 
this part of Europe.7
Trygve Lie expressed negative judgement of the Polish plans. He said that 
"the Atlantic policy annoyed central-European countries. The first to express 
their opinion were the Poles, who kept on creating problems during the whole 
war. They were afraid that growing interest in the Atlantic policy would move 
them aside. They promoted their viewpoint through magazines, interviews, in­
trigues, and rumour spreading, believing they were serving Poland’s and cen­
tral Europe’s best interest”.8
Saying this the Norwegian minister certainly thought about the articles “Swe­
den’s policy of neutrality” and “The underground front grows” which were pub­
lished in January and February 1942 in Free Europe, a Polish biweekly maga­
zine. In the articles the former Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, Halvdan 
Koht had been criticised for his policy of neutrality and the rejection of a Swe­
dish motion to form a defensive Scandinavian bloc.9 These articles assured the 
Norwegian government that the Poles wanted to win Sweden for a prospective 
anti-Soviet bloc and counted on this country to gain leadership in Scandinavia.
The second project launched by Polish government was the organisation 
of a common front of eight occupied countries: Belgium, Czecho-Slovakia, 
Greece, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Luxemburg, and Norway. The first step 
to do this was to be a declaration signed by these governments that would 
establish the foundations for the common policy towards post-war Germany.10 
In the talks with the Poles the Norwegians did not conceal their lack of enthu­
6 E. Duraczyński, R ząd polski na uchodźstwie 1939-1945 , Warszawa 1993, p. 212.
7 S. Holtsmark, Mellom rusefrykt og brobygging, Sovjetunionen i norsk untenrikspolitikk 
1940-1945, Oslo 1988, pp. 157f.
8 T. Lie, Hjemover, Oslo 1958, pp. 55f.
9 RA. UD s arkiv 1940-1949. 25.1/2, Boks 10383, Free Europe.
10 Protokół posiedzenia Rady Ministrów w dniu 4  lutego 1942 r., [w:] Protokoły Posiedzeń Rady 
Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, t. 4, grudzień 1941 -  sierpień 1942, Kraków 1998, p. 137.
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siasm or even hostility towards this project." The Norwegian ministry of for­
eign affairs was against Polish plans for two main reasons. Firstly, Norwegian 
foreign policy aimed at close cooperation with Great Britain and the United 
States, whereas Polish plans referred to the cooperation of small countries. Sec­
ondly, the project might have harmed Norwegian-Swedish relations and might 
have aroused the suspicions of the USSR.12 Therefore, Lie thought it advisable 
to inform the Russians that the Norwegian government had been invited to 
sign a declaration of small countries, but declined this invitation.13
In spite of rather regular meetings of Prime Ministers and ministers of for­
eign affairs of all the eight countries, such a declaration as Sikorski wanted it 
was never signed. Growing tensions between Poland and the USSR worsened 
the atmosphere and the prospects of the smaller allies’ cooperation. Not unim­
portant was also the behaviour of Sikorski, who obviously acted as a leader of 
the smaller allies. In January 1943 at another meeting of the representatives of 
the allied countries he presented a report on his journey to the United States. 
Annoyingly enough, he was reading it for an hour and a half, but the audience 
was more irritated with the information that the Polish Prime Minister intro­
duced himself to President Roosevelt as a representative of all the allied coun­
tries with their alleged authorisation; the authorisation which many of them ca­
tegorically denied having given, when talking to the British ambassador to the 
Polish government, Sir Cecil Dormer. Disgusted Trygve Lie even said that 
“these meetings were a waste of time”.14 T. Lie ascribed the main role in ham­
pering Sikorski’s plans to his own actions. In the letter to a Norwegian envoy 
in Moscow, Rolf Andvord, he wrote: “When Gen. Sikorski returned from the 
USSR he immediately started to work on creating a bloc of the eight occupied 
nations. To my mind this bloc is a sting for Russia. Therefore, I did what I 
could to ruin Polish plans with the help of the Dutch, the Czecho-Slovakians, 
and the Belgians”.15
Fundamental for Norwegian foreign policy appeared to be the relations 
with the Soviet Union and the desire to regulate the contacts with this country. 
Fears of further steps taken by the Russians mingled with the tendencies for 
active cooperation. Hypotheses that giving support to Polish plans might cause 
troubles in the relations with the Soviet Union were the most important reasons 
for the Norwegian government’s disinclination towards the project of Gen. Si­
korski. Moreover, the Norwegians perceived Polish activities as an attempt to 
take over the leadership of the governments in London exile, which, in addi­
tion to the fact that the administration of Norway carefully observed whether
" RA, UD  s arkiv 1940-1949, 25.1./2, boks 10383, Note o f T. Lie, 21. March 1942.
12 S. Holtsamrk, op.cit., p. 164.
13 RA, U d s  arkiv 1940-1949, 25.1/2, boks 10383, Note o f  T. Lie, 5. March 1942.
14 M. Hułas, Goście czy intruzi? R ząd polski na uchodźstwie wrzesień 1939 -  lipiec 1943, 
Warszawa 1996, p. 302.
15 S. Holtsmark, op.cit., p. 162.
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other governments dominated or were favoured by the powers, must have in­
fluenced the negative assessment of Polish activities. After 22 June 1941 Norwe­
gian policy towards the USSR aimed at adjusting any former disagreements. 
Apart from that, the government was looking for some grounds for coopera­
tion in waging war and tried to build good relations as a head start for a post­
war time. At the same time the uncertainty and anxiety over possible Soviet 
intentions was still present. It was specifically the question of the ports for the 
Soviet Union in the north of Norway that strengthened Norwegian distrust, 
even though the Soviets emphasized they did not demand anything from Nor­
way. The government of Norway also believed that particularly the Poles in 
London purposely propagandised so as to “draw Russian attention to the north 
Norway and thus push them away from the Baltic Sea”.16
A Polish brochure entitled “Baltic Sea, Great Britain and peace” printed in 
December 1942 instigated such feelings in the Norwegian milieu. The author 
of the brochure, presenting the Baltic question from the Polish viewpoint, con­
cluded by pointing out the danger of Russian influence over the north water­
ways. He sought to prove that the USSR had no actual interest in the Baltic Sea. 
The natural route for the Soviet ports Archangielsk and Murmansk led through 
the North Cape but when Archangielsk froze in winter the Russians would have 
liked to have an ice-free port in Scandinavia with access to the Atlantic and 
this was where the idea of the ports in the north of Norway had come from.17
In January 1943 Arne Ording, a close adviser to Trygve Lie, wrote in his 
journal about a rumour of Soviet demands towards Northern Norway among 
the soldiers in Scotland as well as in Belgian circles. Ording blamed the Poles 
for it as the representatives of the Polish government on many occasions dis­
cussed the Soviets’ supposed demands with the British, the Americans, and the 
Norwegians. Gen. Sikorski discussed this matter with Prime Minister Churchill 
and President Roosevelt, whereas Józef Retinger (a close collaborator and ad­
viser to Gen. Sikorski) with Hans Christian Berg.18
The Poles believed that the Norwegians’ attitude towards the Soviets was 
based on the unwillingness to acknowledge a Soviet danger threatening Norway, 
whether considering their internal influences or external aggression. The opin­
ion of the Polish envoy was that among the Norwegian authorities there was a 
tendency to positively evaluate any experience, actions, and especially values 
of both the Soviet Union and Stalin. According to Władysław Schwarcburg- 
Giinther, a Polish envoy to the government of Norway from November 1942,
16 Regjeringen og hjemmefronten under krigen, nr. 80, „Politisk oversikt” av Arne Ording 8 
februar 1943.
17 RA, UD s arkiv, 25. 4/91, boks 10494, The Baltic, Britain and Peace of R. Piłsudski.
18 Documents on Polish-Soviet relations 1939-1945, volume I 1939-1943, London 1961, 
doc. Nr 179, conversation between Gen. Sikorski and Churchill, 31 January 1942; nr 194 
conversation between Gen. Sikorski and Roosevelt 24 March 1942; Arne Ording Dagb0ker 19 
juni 1942 -  23 juli 1945, Tano Aschehoug 2000, p. 161.
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what accounted for this was the fact that the Norwegians in London did not 
know Russia and their representative in the Soviet Union, Rolf Andvord, was 
not a clear-sighted expert on Soviet relations. His reports, highly praised in 
Kingston House, were full of appreciation not only for Russian military effort, 
but also for work abilities, organisation, or even politics. Judging by the Nor­
wegian attitude towards the Russians Władysław Giinther clearly stated that 
there would have been virtually no likelihood for the Norwegians to take the 
Polish side in the Polish-Soviet disagreement, especially about the territorial 
question. Some criticism could arise about the Soviet demands for direct inter­
ference into Polish internal affairs, but on the other hand it would not have led 
to any active anti-Soviet opposition. He also doubted in the participation of 
Norway in any action, even a general one, aiming at the protection of the Eu­
ropean status quo ante, in central Europe in particular.19
As soon as the news of the liberation of Norway and the announcement of 
the departure of the Norwegian government to Oslo reached the Polish govern­
ment, the steps were taken to send Polish representatives there. In order to set­
tle the matter as well as to congratulate the Norwegians on 12 May 1945 
Giinther talked with king Haakon and on 15 May with minister Lie. During 
both the meetings the Polish envoy described the Polish situation under the 
rule of the Lublin Government and expressed his hopes of repeating his con­
gratulations on the liberation of Norway in Oslo when he would be there with 
the whole diplomatic corps. In neither case, however, did Gunther’s declara­
tion meet with confirmation. King Haakon deeply regretted that Oslo was in 
such a lamentably uninhabitable state that those legations, which did not have 
their own buildings, would not be able to live there for a while. The king did 
not change his opinion even when the Polish envoy expressed his willingness 
to live and work in a hotel, despite all the inconveniences. This declaration 
was met with silence and it became clear that the habitation conditions were 
only a pretext to discourage the Polish legation from leaving together with the 
Norwegian king for Oslo. Similarly, when asked about the possibility for Po­
lish representatives to depart together with the Norwegian government T. Lie 
said that there were serious difficulties concerning the transport of the govern­
ment and the whole diplomatic corps on a single ship given to their disposition 
by Great Britain, so only a few people from the corps would leave on 25 May. 
The date of departure of the Polish legation was to be decided when the gov­
ernment of Norway settled in Oslo and invite the Polish government; in this 
way the arrival of the Polish legation would only be delayed for a few weeks.
In the case of the departure of the representatives of the Polish govern­
ment in London the Norwegian government decided to temporise. The way the 
Norwegians denied the Polish legation a chance to depart with them was full
19 The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum (hereafter: IPMS), A .51/9, W. Gunther to 
Polish Foreign Ministry, 12 February 1944.
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of courtesy. Both interlocutors declared different technical obstacles, which were 
to be dealt with in a few weeks’ time. Nevertheless, it was evident that the gov­
ernment of Norway considered the position of the Polish government as un­
settled and thus their presence in Oslo as unwelcome. The Norwegian govern­
ment believed it was better to stop the Polish legation from entering Norway 
than to turn them out later on. The Poles were aware of the fact that behind the 
hampering of their departure to Oslo lay Norwegian fear of becoming politi­
cally involved on the Polish side. In contacts with the Norwegian circles they 
tried to emphasise the bad impression that would be made on the public opin­
ion by the absence of the representatives of the government whose army was 
one of the three armies fighting in Narvik.20
All the same, it did not influence the decision the Norwegian government 
made on 5 July 1945. During this afternoon session the Storting acknowledged 
a new Polish government and wished to initiate diplomatic relations without 
further delay.21
The relationship between Norway and Poland during the war was not a 
close one. Although, both governments were in some respects in a similar situ­
ation mutual relations contained tensions. Both governments showed little un­
derstanding of their special position in this period. Norway was determined to 
establish the closest possible cooperation with the western powers, her natural 
allies. She felt closer to Britain and the United States than to countries on the 
European continent. At the same time it was important to maintain good rela­
tions with the Soviet Union. In spite of paying courteous visits and highlight­
ing the friendship between the two countries in official government newspa­
pers -  Polish G azeta Polska, Norwegian Norsk Tidend  -  Polish diplomacy 
could not count on the Norwegians to support their claims. It was clearly visi­
ble that Norway kept its distance and was unwilling to cooperate with Poland 
or support the country, as it could have threatened the good relations Norway 
had with the Soviet Union.
20 IPMS, A 11 E/187 MSZ 1945 Norwegia, Telegram from Polish Foreign Ministry to the 
Polish legation in Stockholm, 29 May 1945.
21 IPMS, A 11 E/842, MSZ, Uchodźcy z Norwegii, W. Patek to Adam Tarnowski.
